Recently in Hindustan Construction Company & Anr vs Union of Supreme Court section 87 was struck down.
Judgment analysis in Nutshell:
In the above matter Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 87 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Arbitration Act, 1996”) as inserted by Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the “2019 Amendment Act”) and brought into force with effect from 30th August,2019. Petitioners also challenged the repeal (with effect from 23rd October,2015) of Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the “2015 Amendment Act”) by Section 15 of the 2019 Amendment Act. Apart from the aforesaid challenge, a challenge is also made to various provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the “Insolvency Code”) which, as stated by the Petitioners, result in discriminatory treatment being meted out to them.
Here we shall discuss the Judgment touching the Section 87 inserted by 2019 Amendment Act in Arbitration Act,1996. To be very specific whether upon filing Section 34 Petition challenging Award, the execution of Award is automatically stayed without security? Let us understand the law and arguments before the Supreme Court.
Facts:
The Arbitration Act, 1996 is based upon the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (as adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985) (“UNCITRAL Model Law”), Article 36(2) of which specifically refers to applications for setting aside or suspension of an award, in which the other party may provide appropriate security. Contrary to Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has been construed by judgments of apex Court as granting an ‘automatic-stay’ the moment a Section 34 application is filed within time. From the plain language of Section 36, automatic-stay does not follow, and the judgments of Supreme Court which have so held would require a revisit by this larger bench. In any case, the 246th Report of the Law Commission of India titled, ‘Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996’ (August, 2014) (hereinafter referred to as the “246th Law Commission Report”) recommended that Section 36 be amended, which was in fact done by the 2015 Amendment Act, so that automatic-stays are now things of the past. However, despite the fact that the 2015 Amendment Act made large-scale changes to the Arbitration Act, 1996, keeping in view the objects of the Arbitration Act, 1996 of minimum judicial intervention, speedy determination and recovery of amounts contained in arbitral awards, yet, another ‘High-Level Committee to Review the Institutionalization of Arbitration Mechanism in India’ headed by Retd. Justice B.N. Srikrishna by its report dated 30th July,2017 (hereinafter referred to as the “Srikrishna Committee Report”) opined that the 2015 Amendment Act should not apply to pending court proceedings which have commenced after 23rd October,2015 (i.e. the date of the 2015 Amendment Act coming into force), but should only apply in case arbitral proceedings have themselves been commenced post 23rd October, 2015, which would include court proceedings relating thereto. The Government of India issued a Press Release on 7th March,2018 to enact a new Section 87 in accord with what the Srikrishna Committee Report had opined, before Supreme Court decided the case of BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 6 SCC 287 (which was decided on 15th March,2018). Despite the fact that this Court specifically opined in the said judgment that the aforesaid provision would be contrary to the object of the 2015 Amendment Act, and despite the fact that the judgment was specifically sent to the Ministry of Law and Justice and to the learned Attorney General for India, Section 87 was enacted, reference being made only to the Srikrishna Committee Report, without even a mention of the aforesaid judgment of this Court in BCCI (supra).
It was alleged that, Section 87 is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India, as it is contrary to the object of the principal Arbitration Act, 1996 itself; takes away the vested right of enforcement and binding nature of an arbitral award; and without removing the basis of the BCCI judgment (supra), acts in the teeth of the said judgment, making the said section unreasonable, excessive, disproportionate as well as arbitrary.
Removal of the basis of the BCCI judgment by the 2019 Amendment Act
For this purpose, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the 2019 Amendment Act. Section 87 as introduced by Section 13 of the 2019 Amendment Act reads as follows:
“87. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the amendments made to this Act by the
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 shall–
not apply to-
arbitral proceedings commenced before the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015;
court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings irrespective of whether such court proceedings are commenced prior to or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015;
apply only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 and to court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings.”
By Section 15 of the same Amendment Act, Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act was omitted as follows:
“15. Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 shall be omitted and shall be deemed to have been omitted with effect from the 23rd October, 2015.”
Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act reads as follows:
“26. Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of this Act.”
Apex Court’s judgment in BCCI (supra) had occasion to deal with the important question as to the true interpretation of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act. This Court, in paragraph 28, referred to the transitory provision contained in Section 85-A as proposed in the 246th Law Commission Report, and thereafter in paragraphs 29 to 31, referred to the debates on the floor of the House. In paragraph 32, this Court referred to the differences between Section 26 and Section 85-A as proposed, and then held:
“33. What can be seen from the above is that Section 26 has, while retaining the bifurcation of proceedings into arbitration and court proceedings, departed somewhat from Section 85-A as proposed by the Law Commission.”
Section 26 was then stated to have bifurcated proceedings with a great degree of clarity into two sets of proceedings – arbitral proceedings themselves, and court proceedings in relation thereto.
Paragraph 39 of the judgment refers to this and states as follows:
“39. Section 26, therefore, bifurcates proceedings, as has been stated above, with a great degree of clarity, into two sets of proceedings — arbitral proceedings themselves, and court proceedings in relation thereto. The reason why the first part of Section 26 is couched in negative form is only to state that the Amendment Act will apply even to arbitral proceedings commenced before the amendment if parties otherwise agree. If the first part of Section 26 were couched in positive language (like the second part), it would have been necessary to add a proviso stating that the Amendment Act would apply even to arbitral proceedings commenced before the amendment if the parties agree. In either case, the intention of the legislature remains the same, the negative form conveying exactly what could have been stated positively, with the necessary proviso. Obviously, “arbitral proceedings” having been subsumed in the first part cannot re-appear in the second part, and the expression “in relation to arbitral proceedings” would, therefore, apply only to court proceedings which relate to the arbitral proceedings. The scheme of Section 26 is thus clear: that the Amendment Act is prospective in nature, and will apply to those arbitral proceedings that are commenced, as understood by Section 21 of the principal Act, on or after the Amendment Act, and to court proceedings which have commenced on or after the Amendment Act came into force.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Court was alive to the Srikrishna Committee Report’s recommendation of a proposed Section 87, as is clear from footnote 23 appended to paragraph 44 of the judgment. The Court then made a reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 2015 Amendment Act and stated as follows:
“77. However, it is important to remember that the Amendment Act was enacted for the following reasons, as the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Amendment Act states:
“2. The Act was enacted to provide for speedy disposal of cases relating to arbitration with least court intervention. With the passage of time, some difficulties in the applicability of the Act have been noticed. Interpretation of the provisions of the Act by courts in some cases have resulted in delay of disposal of arbitration proceedings and increase in interference of courts in arbitration matters, which tend to defeat the object of the Act. With a view to overcome the difficulties, the matter was referred to the Law Commission of India, which examined the issue in detail and submitted its 176th Report. On the basis of the said Report, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2003 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 22-12-2003. The said Bill was referred to the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice for examination and report. The said Committee, submitted its Report to Parliament on 4-8-2005, wherein the Committee recommended that since many provisions of the said Bill were contentious, the Bill may be withdrawn and a fresh legislation may be brought after considering its recommendations. Accordingly, the said Bill was withdrawn from the Rajya Sabha.
On a reference made again in pursuance of the above, the Law Commission examined and submitted its 246th Report on “Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996” in August 2014 and recommended various amendments in the Act. The proposed amendments to the Act would facilitate and encourage Alternative Dispute Mechanism, especially arbitration, for settlement of disputes in a more userfriendly, cost-effective and expeditious disposal of cases since India is committed to improve its legal framework to obviate in disposal of cases.
As India has been ranked at 178 out of 189 nations in the world in contract enforcement, it is high time that urgent steps are taken to facilitate quick enforcement of contracts, easy recovery of monetary claims and award of just compensation for damages suffered and reduce the pendency of cases in courts and hasten the process of dispute resolution through arbitration, so as to encourage investment and economic activity.
As Parliament was not in session and immediate steps were required to be taken to make necessary amendments to the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to attract foreign investment by projecting India as an investor friendly country having a sound legal framework, the President was pleased to promulgate the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015.
It is proposed to introduce the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2015, to replace the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, which inter alia, provides for the following, namely—
to amend the definition of “Court” to provide that in the case of international commercial arbitrations, the Court should be the High Court;
to ensure that an Indian court can exercise jurisdiction to grant interim measures, etc., even where the seat of the arbitration is outside India;
an application for appointment of an arbitrator shall be disposed of by the High Court or Supreme Court, as the case may be, as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour should be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days;
to provide that while considering any application for appointment of arbitrator, the High Court or the Supreme Court shall examine the existence of a prima facie arbitration agreement and not other issues;
to provide that the Arbitral Tribunal shall make its award within a period of twelve months from the date it enters upon the reference and that the parties may, however, extend such period up to six months, beyond which period any extension can only be granted by the Court, on sufficient cause;
to provide for a model fee schedule on the basis of which High Courts may frame rules for the purpose of determination of fees of Arbitral Tribunal, where a High Court appoints arbitrator in terms of Section 11 of the Act;
to provide that the parties to dispute may at any stage agree in writing that their dispute be resolved through fast-track procedure and the award in such cases shall be made within a period of six months;
to provide for neutrality of arbitrators, when a person is approached in connection with possible appointment as an arbitrator;
to provide that application to challenge the award is to be disposed of by the Court within one year.
The amendments proposed in the Bill will ensure that arbitration process becomes more user-friendly, cost-effective and lead to expeditious disposal of cases.”
The Government will be well-advised in keeping the aforesaid Statement of Objects and Reasons in the forefront, if it proposes to enact Section 87 on the lines indicated in the Government’s Press Release dated 7-3-2018. The immediate effect of the proposed Section 87 would be to put all the important amendments made by the Amendment Act on a back-burner, such as the important amendments made to Sections 28 and 34 in particular, which, as has been stated by the Statement of Objects and Reasons, “… have resulted in delay of disposal of arbitration proceedings and increase in interference of courts in arbitration matters, which tend to defeat the object of the Act”, and will now not be applicable to Section 34 petitions filed after 23-10-2015, but will be applicable to Section 34 petitions filed in cases where arbitration proceedings have themselves commenced only after 23-102015. This would mean that in all matters which are in the pipeline, despite the fact that Section 34 proceedings have been initiated only after 23-10-2015, yet, the old law would continue to apply resulting in delay of disposal of arbitration proceedings by increased interference of courts, which ultimately defeats the object of the 1996 Act. [These amendments have the effect, as stated in HRD Corpn. v. GAIL (India) Ltd., (2018) 12 SCC 471 of limiting the grounds of challenge to awards as follows: (SCC p. 493, para 18)“18. In fact, the same Law Commission Report has amended Sections 28 and 34 so as to narrow grounds of challenge available under the Act. The judgment in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 has been expressly done away with. So has the judgment in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263. Both Sections 34 and 48 have been brought back to the position of law contained in Renusagar Power Plant Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, where “public policy” will now include only two of the three things set out therein viz. “fundamental policy of Indian law” and “justice or morality”. The ground relating to “the interest of India” no longer obtains. “Fundamental policy of Indian law” is now to be understood as laid down in Renusagar, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644.
“Justice or morality” has been tightened and is now to be understood as meaning only basic notions of justice and morality i.e. such notions as would shock the conscience of the Court as understood in Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204. Section 28(3) has also been amended to bring it in line with the judgment of this Court in Associate Builders, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204, making it clear that the construction of the terms of the contract is primarily for the arbitrator to decide unless it is found that such a construction is not a possible one.”] It would be important to remember that the 246th Law Commission Report has itself bifurcated proceedings into two parts, so that the Amendment Act can apply to court proceedings commenced on or after 23-10-2015. It is this basic scheme which is adhered to by Section 26 of the Amendment Act, which ought not to be displaced as the very object of the enactment of the Amendment Act would otherwise be defeated.”
(emphasis supplied)
In paragraph 83, the Court then concluded:
“83. In view of the above, the present batch of appeals is dismissed. A copy of the judgment is to be sent to the Ministry of Law and Justice and the learned Attorney General for India in view of what is stated in paras 77 and 78 supra.”
After construing Section 26 in the manner stated in the judgment, Court cautioned the Government by stating that the immediate effect of enacting the proposed Section 87 would be directly contrary to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2015 Amendment Act, which made it clear that the law prior to the 2015 Amendment Act resulted in delay of disposal of arbitral proceedings, and an increase in interference by courts in arbitration matters, which tends to defeat a primary object of the Arbitration Act, 1996 itself. It was therefore stated that all the amendments made by the 2015 Amendment Act, and important amendments in particular that were made to Sections 28 and 34, would now be put on a backburner, which would be contrary not only to what the 246th Law Commission had in mind, but also directly contrary to the salutary provisions that were made to correct defects that were found in the working of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
At this point it is important to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2019 Amendment Act which introduced Section 87. In paragraphs 2 to 6 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, the Srikrishna Committee Report alone is referred to, and paragraph 6(vi) in particular states as follows:
“6. The salient features of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2019, inter alia, are as follows:- xxx xxx xxx
(vi) to clarify that Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 is applicable only to the arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after 23rd October, 2015 and to such court proceedings which emanate from such arbitral proceedings.”
Interestingly, no such clarification was made by the 2019 Amendment Act. Instead, Section 26 was omitted with effect from 23.10.2015 and Section 87 introduced.
What is important is to see whether, in substance, the basis of a particular judgment is in fact removed, whether or not that judgment is referred to in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending act which seeks to remove its basis. Given the aforesaid judgments, Section 15 of the 2019 Amendment Act removes the basis of BCCI (supra) by omitting from the very start Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act. Since this is the provision that has been construed in the BCCI judgment (supra), there can be no doubt whatsoever that one fundamental prop of the said judgment has been removed by retrospectively omitting Section 26 altogether from the very day when it came into force. This argument must therefore be rejected.
Constitutional Challenge to the 2019 Amendment Act
The examination of the constitutional validity of the introduction of Section 87 into the Arbitration Act, 1996, and deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act by the 2019 Amendment Act against Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 and Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The Srikrishna Committee Report recommended the introduction of Section 87 owing to the fact that there were conflicting High Court judgments on the reach of the 2015 Amendment Act at the time when the Committee deliberated on this subject. This was stated as follows in the Srikrishna Committee Report:
“However, section 26 has remained silent on the applicability of the 2015 amendment Act to court proceedings, both pending and newly initiated in case of arbitrations commenced prior to 23 October 2015. Different High Courts in India have taken divergent views on the applicability of the 2015 Amendment Act to such court proceedings. Broadly, there are three sets of views as summarised below:
The 2015 Amendment Act is not applicable to court proceedings (fresh and pending) where the arbitral proceedings to which they relate commenced before 23 October 2015.
The first part of section 26 is narrower than the second and only excludes arbitral proceedings commenced prior to 23 October 2015 from the application of the 2015 Amendment Act. The 2015 Amendment Act would, however, apply to fresh or pending court proceedings in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced prior to 23 October 2015.
The wording “arbitral proceedings” in section 26 cannot be construed to include related court proceedings. Accordingly, the 2015 Amendment Act applied to all arbitrations commenced on or after 23 October 2015. As far as court proceedings are concerned, the 2015 Amendment Act would apply to all court proceedings from 23October 2015, including fresh or pending court proceedings in relation to arbitration commenced before, on or after 23 October 2015.
Thus, it is evident that there is considerable confusion regarding the applicability of the 2015 Amendment Act to related court proceedings in arbitration commenced before 23 October 2015.The Committee is of the view that a suitable legislative amendment is required to address this issue.
The committee feels that permitting the 2015 Amendment Act to apply to pending court proceedings related to arbitrations commenced prior to 23 October 2015 would result in uncertainty and prejudice to parties, as they may have to be heard again. It may also not be advisable to make the 2015 Amendment Act applicable to fresh court proceedings in relation to such arbitrations, as it may result in an inconsistent position. Therefore, it is felt that it may be desirable to limit the applicability of the 2015 Amendment Act to arbitrations commenced on or after 23 October 2015 and related court proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Srikrishna Committee Report is dated 30.07.2017, which is long before this Court’s judgment in the BCCI case (supra). Whatever uncertainty there may have been because of the interpretation by different High Courts has disappeared as a result of the BCCI judgment (supra), the law on Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act being laid down with great clarity. To thereafter delete this salutary provision and introduce Section 87 in its place, would be wholly without justification and contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2015 Amendment Act, which was enacted pursuant to a detailed Law Commission report which found various infirmities in the working of the original 1996 statute. Also, it is not understood as to how “uncertainty and prejudice would be caused, as they may have to be heard again”, resulting in an ‘inconsistent position’. The amended law would be applied to pending court proceedings, which would then have to be disposed of in accordance therewith, resulting in the benefits of the 2015 Amendment Act now being applied. To refer to the Srikrishna Committee Report (without at all referring to this Court’s judgment) even after the judgment has pointed out the pitfalls of following such provision, would render Section 87 and the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act manifestly arbitrary, having been enacted unreasonably, without adequate determining principle, and contrary to the public interest sought to be subserved by the Arbitration Act, 1996 and the 2015 Amendment Act. This is for the reason that a key finding of the BCCI judgment (supra) is that the introduction of Section 87 would result in a delay of disposal of arbitration proceedings, and an increase in the interference of courts in arbitration matters, which defeats the very object of the Arbitration Act, 1996, which was strengthened by the 2015 Amendment Act.
Further, Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is a summary proceeding not in the nature of a regular suit – see Canara Nidhi Ltd. v. M. Shashikala 2019 SCC Online SC 1244 at paragraph 20. As a result, a court reviewing an arbitral award under Section 34 does not sit in appeal over the award, and if the view taken by the arbitrator is possible, no interference is called for – see Associated Construction v. Pawanhans Helicopters Ltd. (2008) 16 SCC 128 at paragraph 17.
Also, as has been held in the recent decision Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI 2019 SCC Online 677, after the 2015 Amendment Act, this Court cannot interfere with an arbitral award on merits (see paragraph 28 and 76 therein). The anomaly, therefore, of Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC applying in the case of full-blown appeals, and not being applicable by reason of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 when it comes to review of arbitral awards, (where an appeal is in the nature of a rehearing of the original proceeding, where the chance of succeeding is far greater than in a restricted review of arbitral awards under Section 34), is itself a circumstance which militates against the enactment of Section 87, placing the amendments made in the 2015 Amendment Act, in particular Section 36, on a backburner. For this reason also, Section 87 must be struck down as manifestly arbitrary under Article 14.
Observed:
It was observed by the Supreme Court in the matter under discussion that, the petitioners are also correct in stating that when the mischief of the misconstruction of Section 36 was corrected after a period of more than 19 years by legislative intervention in 2015, to now work in the reverse direction and bring back the aforesaid mischief itself results in manifest arbitrariness. The retrospective resurrection of an automatic-stay not only turns the clock backwards contrary to the object of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and the 2015 Amendment Act, but also results in payments already made under the amended Section 36 to award-holders in a situation of no-stay or conditional-stay now being reversed. In fact, refund applications have been filed in some of the cases before us, praying that monies that have been released for payment as a result of conditional stay orders be returned to the judgment-debtor.
Also, it is important to notice that the Srikrishna Committee Report did not refer to the provisions of the Insolvency Code. After the advent of the Insolvency Code on 01.12.2016, the consequence of applying Section 87 is that due to the automatic-stay doctrine laid down by judgments of this Court – which have only been reversed today by the present judgment – the award-holder may become insolvent by defaulting on its payment to its suppliers, when such payments would be forthcoming from arbitral awards in cases where there is no stay, or even in cases where conditional stays are granted. Also, an arbitral award-holder is deprived of the fruits of its award – which is usually obtained after several years of litigating – as a result of the automatic-stay, whereas it would be faced with immediate payment to its operational creditors, which payments may not be forthcoming due to monies not being released on account of automatic-stays of arbitral awards, exposing such award-holders to the rigors of the Insolvency Code.
Final order and Judgment
For all these reasons, the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act, together with the insertion of Section 87 into the Arbitration Act, 1996 by the 2019 Amendment Act, is struck down as being manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 when it comes to review of arbitral awards, (where an appeal is in the nature of a rehearing of the original proceeding, where the chance of succeeding is far greater than in a restricted review of arbitral awards under Section (34), is itself a circumstance which militates against the enactment of Section 87, placing the amendments made in the 2015 Amendment Act, in particular Section 36, on a backburner. For this reason, also, Section 87 must be struck down as manifestly arbitrary under Article 14. The petitioners are also correct in stating that when the mischief of the misconstruction of Section 36 was corrected after a period of more than 19 years by legislative intervention in 2015, to now work in the reverse direction and bring back the aforesaid mischief itself results in manifest arbitrariness. The retrospective resurrection of an automatic-stay not only turns the clock backwards contrary to the object of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and the 2015 Amendment Act, but also results in payments already made under the amended Section 36 to award-holders in a situation of no-stay or conditional-stay now being reversed. In fact, refund applications have been filed in some of the cases before us, praying that monies that have been released for payment as a result of conditional stay orders be returned to the judgment-debtor.
Shruti Desai
1st December,2019
Mumbai.
Comentarios